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* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 




 Pro se appellant Curtis L. Gibson appeals from the order of the District Court 
granting summary judgment in favor of the defendants-appellees.  For the reasons that 
follow, we will affirm. 
 Because the parties are familiar with the proceedings, we present only a summary 
of the background.  Gibson is a Pennsylvania state prisoner.  In 2017, he filed a civil 
rights complaint concerning the State Correctional Institution at Smithfield, identifying as 
defendants Captain Crouch, Jr., Sergeant Wiser, and Corrections Officers Brennan and 
Frock.  Gibson alleged that on December 31, 2016, he was placed in cell KA-25 in the 
Restricted Housing Unit.  Shortly after he arrived, he tried to get a drink of water from 
the sink, but neither faucet worked.  He used various prison channels to notify staff of the 
lack of running water, stating that he asked to speak with the “white shirt” in charge, later 
identified as Crouch.  Gibson alleged that a maintenance worker arrived on January 6, 
2017 and turned on the water, but meanwhile, he was forced to drink toilet water.  Gibson 
asserted that the defendants had been aware of the faulty sink before assigning him to the 
cell, and by assigning him to a cell with a broken sink for seven days, they violated his 
Eighth Amendment rights to be free from cruel and unusual punishment. 
 In 2018, the District Court granted Crouch’s motion for summary judgment based 
on Gibson’s failure to exhaust administrative remedies.  In 2019, the District Court 




complaint.1  Gibson filed several motions.  He contested the District Court’s decision 
regarding the failure to exhaust, asserting that prison officials committed perjury and 
submitted false evidence pertaining to the grievance dates.  He also alleged bias by the 
District Judge.  The defendants filed a motion for summary judgment on Gibson’s Eighth 
Amendment claim, arguing that the maintenance work orders on file for Gibson’s cell 
during the relevant time establish that Gibson had running water in his cell.  In support, 
the defendants filed an appendix of documents, including copies of the maintenance work 
orders.  The defendants also included copies of Gibson’s grievance forms and the 
prison’s denials of relief to respond to Gibson’s allegations that they had committed 
perjury.  Gibson filed responses and his own motion for summary judgment. 
 In April 2020, the District Court vacated the prior memorandum and order 
granting summary judgment to defendant Crouch, finding that Gibson had met the 
administrative exhaustion requirement to proceed on his prison conditions lawsuit.  The 
District Court acknowledged that, under certain circumstances, the deprivation of 
drinking water to a prisoner may rise to the level of an Eighth Amendment deprivation of 
a basic human need.  (See District Court ECF #161 at 11-12 (citing Young v. Quinlan, 
960 F.2d 351, 364-65 (3d Cir. 1992), superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in 
Nyhuis v. Reno, 204 F.3d 65, 71 n.7 (3d Cir. 2000)).)  However, the District Court 
 
 
1 We dismissed Gibson’s prior appeals concerning these decisions, C.A. Nos. 18-3062 




granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment on the Eighth Amendment claim 
and denied Gibson’s motion for summary judgment.  Gibson filed a timely notice of 
appeal concerning the District Court’s April 2020 order. 
 We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We exercise plenary review over 
the grant of summary judgment, applying the same standard as the District Court.  See 
Thomas v. Tice, 948 F.3d 133, 137 (3d Cir. 2020).  Under Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 56(a), summary judgment is proper when, drawing all reasonable inferences 
and viewing the record in the light most favorable to the nonmovant, there is no genuine 
dispute of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  See id. 
at 137-38; see also Fakete v. Aetna, Inc., 308 F.3d 335, 337 (3d Cir. 2002).  We may 
affirm the District Court on any ground supported by the record.  Tourscher v. 
McCullough, 184 F.3d 236, 240 (3d Cir. 1999). 
 Gibson argues that, for purposes of Rule 56(c), the defendants’ documentation of 
the plumbing work orders does not show the absence of a genuine issue of any material 
fact.  Indeed, accepting the credibility of Gibson’s own evidence at this stage, see 
Paladino v. Newsome, 885 F.3d 203, 209–10 (3d Cir. 2018), the maintenance paperwork 
for Gibson’s cell leaves room for a factual dispute.  The defendants’ Exhibit B-1 shows a 
work order entered on December 17, 2016, stating that the cold water was not working 
and that the hot water was “constantly running,” with the comment of “repaired sink” on 




order entered on December 29, 2016, two days before Gibson was assigned to the cell, 
again noting that the “sink continuously runs.”  (Id. at 69.)  The defendants thus argued 
that the evidence showed that Gibson was never deprived of running water because the 
hot water had been documented as running continuously in his cell.  The District Court 
agreed, noting, “There is no evidence that Gibson was without running water in his cell at 
any time during the seven days at issue.”  (District Court ECF #161 at 13.)  Yet Exhibit 
B-2 shows a work completion date of January 6, 2017, with the staff comment: “turned 
valves back on—no issue at this time.”  (District Court ECF #153 at 69.)  This staff 
comment appears to support Gibson’s allegations that his sink had no running water until 
a maintenance worker turned the water “back on” on January 6, 2017. 
 Yet our review does not end here.  The District Court also concluded that Gibson 
would not be entitled to relief because there was no evidence that Gibson was deprived of 
all access to fluids from December 31, 2016, through January 6, 2017, such that the lack 
of running water from the sink constituted an Eighth Amendment violation.  (See District 
Court ECF #161 at 14.)  We agree.  To prove an Eighth Amendment violation, Gibson 
would have to show that he was deprived of a basic human need, that the deprivation was 
sufficiently serious, and that a prison official acted with deliberate indifference in 
effecting that deprivation.  See Renchenski v. Williams, 622 F.3d 315, 338 (3d Cir. 




evidence does not create a genuine issue of a deprivation so serious that it amounts to 
cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment. 
 Finally, Gibson continues to assert that the defendants submitted false evidence 
pertaining to the grievance dates, and he argues that the documents are inadmissible.  To 
the extent that Gibson’s arguments are framed under Rule 56(c)(2), the alleged date 
discrepancies concerning Gibson’s pursuit of grievances no longer appear to be relevant, 
given that the District Court deemed his claims to have been exhausted.  Gibson also 
argues that the District Judge’s rulings were biased.  He provides no adequate basis for 
that argument.  See e.g., Securacomm Consulting, Inc. v. Securacom Inc., 224 F.3d 273, 
278 (3d Cir. 2000) (discussing allegations of bias for a recusal motion, reiterating the 
principle that “a party’s displeasure with legal rulings does not form an adequate basis for 
recusal”). 
 Based on the above, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment.  Gibson’s 
motion to dismiss and for summary judgment, filed in this Court, is denied. 
